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El prestigi empresarial: Anâlisi a través de les conselleries creuades

The business prestige: A preliminary study based on interlocks within companies

Journal Name:

  • Intangible Capital

Publication Year:

  • 2011
DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/ic.2011.v7n2.p585-610

Key Words:

Keywords (Original Language):

Author NameUniversity of Author
Abstract (2. Language): 
Purpose: The literature on interlocked directorate or interlocks has proposed the presence of cross-directors as an influential factor in the prestige of a firm (Mizruchi, 1996). This theory is based on the fact that, by having multiple companies with interlocks within them, major stakeholders of the company ought to have a higher perception of prestige. The aim of this preliminary study is to present an exploratory study and suggest future research lines on this issue. Design/methodology/approach: In a first preliminary study, we evaluate the interlocks network comprising companies belonging to the ranking established by the MERCO report in Spain for the year 2010. This is a well-known ranking of corporate reputation in Spain used in recent articles (Luna & Fernandez, 2010). For further analysis, other variables are considered as being quoted in the Spanish market benchmark index, IBEX 35, and the location of the headquarters. Findings: Significant positive relationship was obtained between the number of directorships shared with other public companies and the perceived prestige that stakeholders perceive from the firm. Similarly, we obtain significant positive correlation between the prestige and being listed on the IBEX 35. Finally, we identified banking, construction and energy sectors as the ones that use interlocking directorates more intensively. Research limitations: The results of this preliminary study show the viability of future studies about prestige and interlocks (Mizruchi, 1996). For the validation of the theory described in this study, it should be replicated in different regions and, with larger samples, to observe the effect that interlocks have on the perception of prestige of the company. Practical implications / Originality/value: This is among the first studies showing the existence of a relationship between interlocks and business prestige. It highlights the importance of the composition of the boards for the perceived prestige of enterprises.
Abstract (Original Language): 
Objecte: En la literatura sobre xarxes de conselleries creuades, interlocked directorate o interlocks, s’ha plantejat la presència de consellers creuats com un factor influent en el prestigi d'una empresa (Mizruchi, 1996). Aquesta teoria es basa en què, pel fet de tenir diversos interlocks amb empreses importants, els stakeholders de l'empresa n’haurien de tenir una percepció de prestigi més elevada. El que es pretén amb aquest estudi preliminar és presentar un estudi exploratori i plantejar línies futures de recerca sobre aquesta qüestió. Disseny/metodologia/enfocament: En un primer estudi preliminar, s'ha avaluat la xarxa d’interlocks que componen les empreses pertanyents al rànquing de l'Informe MERCO 2010 d'Espanya. Aquest és un rànquing de reputació corporativa de gran èxit a Espanya i en actual expansió internacional ja utilitzat en articles recents (Luna & Fernández, 2010). Per a més profunditat d'anàlisi es consideraran altres variables com cotitzar en l'índex de referència del mercat espanyol, l'IBEX 35, i la localització de la seu social. Aportacions i resultats: S’obtenen relacions positives significatives entre la quantitat de conselleries comunes amb altres empreses i la percepció de prestigi que dóna l'empresa als seus stakeholders. Paral·lelament, s'obtenen relacions positives significatives entre el prestigi i el cotitzar a l'IBEX 35. Finalment, s'identifiquen banca, construcció i energia com els sectors que fan un ús més intensiu de les conselleries creuades.Limitacions: Els resultats d’aquest estudi preliminar obren el camí a futurs estudis sobre la influència entre el prestigi i els interlocks (Mizruchi, 1996). Per una validació de la teoria descrita s’hauria de replicar aquest estudi en diferents regions i, amb una mostra major observar l'efecte que tenen les conselleries creuades sobre la percepció de prestigi de l'empresa. Implicacions pràctiques/Valor afegit: Aquest és el primer estudi que mostra la existència d'una relació entre els interlocks i el prestigi empresarial. Fa palesa la importància de la composició dels consells per a la percepció de prestigi de les empreses.
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