Journal Name:
- Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management
| Author Name | University of Author |
|---|---|
Abstract (2. Language):
Purpose: The Chinese government takes measures to promote the development of green
building (GB). But until 2013, there are only few green buildings in China. The real estate
developers are skeptical in entering GB market, which requires theories to explain developers
and government’s behaviors.
Design/methodology/approach: In this study, we attempt Evolutionary game theory and
System dynamics (SD) into the analysis. A system dynamics model is built for studying
evolutionary games between the government and developers in greening building decision
making.
Findings and Originality/value: The results of mixed-strategy stability analysis and SD
simulation show that evolutionary equilibrium does not exist with a static government incentive.
Therefore, a dynamical incentive is suggested in the SD model for promoting the green building
market. The symmetric game and asymmetric game between two developers show, if the
primary proportion who choose GB strategy is lower, all the group in game may finally evolve
to GB strategy. In this case and in this time, the government should take measures to encourage
developers to enter into the GB market. If the proportion who choose GB strategy is high
enough, the government should gradually cancel or reduce those incentive measure.
Research limitations/implications: an Evolution Analysis and System Dynamics Simulation
on Behaviors of Real Estate Developers and Government could give some advice for the
government to promote the green building market.
Bookmark/Search this post with
FULL TEXT (PDF):
- 2