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Gönüllü Kolektif Hareketin Mantığı

Logic of Voluntary Collective Action

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Abstract (2. Language): 
This article examines the rationale of voluntary collective action through institutionalist and rational choice perspectives. While it looks into this phenomenon from a standpoint of individual rationalism, it does not overlook social institutions and other exogenous factors. The relevant literature has been reviewed to seek answers to how and why these exogenous factors enter into individual calculations and thus, how the problems of collective actions are resolved
Abstract (Original Language): 
Bu makale gönüllü kolektif davranısın (eylem) nedenlerini kurumsal ve rasyonel tercih yaklasımları açısından sorgulamaktadır. Hareket noktası bireysel rasyonalizm olmakla beraber sosyal kurumlar ve diğer çevresel faktörler analiz dısında bırakılmamıstır. Đlgili literatür taranarak bu dıssal faktörlerin bireyin yöntem ve sonuçlarla ilgili bilissel hesaplamalarına nasıl katıldığı ve kolektif hareket problemlerin nasıl çözüldüğü ile ilgili sorulara da yanıtlar aranmaktadır.
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